Are you aware that Cairo Mezz was actually presented as an idea at last year's "Weird Shit Investment Conference"? Would be a funny coincidence if this rather unknown and obscure company is selected twice for the purpose haha
Ah Cairo Mezz, good old memories 😁. Received the shares via the spin-off. Was a really opaque situation (still is). Have the shares now some liquidity? Sold them during 2020 and it was a real headache because of the abysmaly low liquidity.
Thought doValue would be more interesting because servicing is better than owning assets.
There is decent liquidity in Athens markets (and sometimes in Frankfurt), but I am not sure what size you are looking at. Could build my position relatively quickly.
doValue is interesting and they could earn a windfall from Cairo and other situations aswell. I have not looked through their portfolio. On the other hand, in recent years, their performance has been kind of mediocre and other debt servicers like Intrum have also struggled.
I am not an expert on all of them, but I like that Cairo 3 has been the fastest one to pay down so far. Also, the structure of having the mezzanine note interest capitalized is not in place for all the others, e.g. PV pays out mezz interest. I think with capitalized interest, there might be a larger effect if people ever realize that cash actually arrives.
Moreover, I have some comfort in Fairfax being onboard.
The Irish filings are super interesting! I wasn’t able to find those in my own quick research after I first read the VIC pitch; the collateralization is decent enough and those mortgages aren’t underwater any longer.
The other angle I need to examine is what repossession or rule of law around repossession looks like in Greece at the moment. How much capacity does DoValue have to actually go after these assets?
Definitely one of my favourite weirdest ideas right now.
What are you thoughts on getting legal counsel to address this material piece of information that was hidden? DM me. This is a material misstatement that needs to be taken out of the skin of someone. I imagine there are D&O policies at the company or the auditor to go after.
as an answer to the issue raised by an individual investor within the Greek community of microinvestors..
Opinions are divided here between the following two scenarios that can be drawn based on the wording of the announcement that makes no mention at all about the so far accrued interest on the principal (which is what we all have calculated before buying this stock!):
a) doValue can buy us all out at a fraction of what the above calculations you have discussed indicate i.e. we are screwed!
b) the Strike Price is on top of the accrued interest on the principal starting from 2020 (or 2019 as you say) in order to buy out future revenues (capital + interest), as we (Cairo plc) have established the claim for these influxes from previous years.
Further clarifications on the matter will be asked from the Exchange authorities and thus the company. Also in the General Assembly of the Shareholders that is due next month. However, I would be very much interested to see your thoughts on the matter based on your experience!
thank you for your question. Full Disclosure: I sold out of Cairo Mezz shortly after the annual report was published which contained new information on the call strike price. While the disclosure in the annual financial statements was somewhat ambiguous to me, I would not have invested in Cairo Mezz if that disclosure had been out there before. Consequently, selling appeared appropriate.
As to the Announcement you quote, in my view, a) is the correct interpretation. This is because I do not see any language hinting towards the strike price being on top of the accrued interest. To the contrary, it is clearly stated that the accrued but unpaid interest is included in the strike price. So if doValue had bought the loan portfolio of Cairo 3 by exercising its option on 31 December 2025, Cairo Mezz would have been entitled to receive 65.5m (potentially less costs). There are a few twists and turns and details, such as the strike price increasing over time, costs being higher or lower, the implication for ReoCos, cash on the balance sheet - but that appears to be the rough picture.
What I am honestly struggling with is the role of the independent valuers and auditors. They MUST have known that the option exists and MUST have been able to calculate the current strike price every time they look at this. Yet they did value / audit Cairo 3 B2 for 238m EUR (2024) or 146m EUR (2025). If I own an asset and somebody has the contractual right to buy this asset for 66m EUR, how is it possible to value it at 146m? Implying an §exercise probability" of 30% just means that you think the other party behaves irrationally/stupidly or is restricted from locking in this gains. So in my view, a severe mistake was made in the valuation and audit of the asset. This may be due to gross negligence, lack of professionalism or other reasons but it is clear that these parties did not do their jobs properly and, in consequence, small investors have been suffering and losing money. It should be an "interesting" general meeting and I am not sure how things will develop from here - But I do feel sorry for you and other Greek microinvestors.
Unfortunately I was on travel when the results came on the 30th of April and I did not find the time to review them on time. Had I done that in the correct time I would have probably sold out as well! But only to rebuy at a lower price (lower than the strike price) in my case, as I still believe there is great value in this stock (as well as the rest of the Greek securitisations especially Galaxy Cosmos that is my largest position in this sector).
This whole situation is very frustrating as you can understand! While it is clearly stated in the Admission document (100% clear in the Greek text!) that the buy out option means they will pay the nominal value, they are letting us know now of something very different. Only after the intervention of individual investors to the company and then to the authorities the strike price formula became public knowledge. The role of KPMG is also weird. Gross negligence is the good case scenario for them! As you can understand there is clear scope for legal action in case something like this goes forward.
The coming AGM will be very interesting indeed! It is not official yet, but the community of microinvestors have gathered the 5% that gives us the advanced rights to put pressure to the management to answer our questions and take action against whoever acts against our rightful interests based on the original documentation. We also have the commitment of support by a number of institutional investors that are also surprised by their own admission from this development.
The gun of legal action is obviously on the table, although nooone wishes it will be used. I hope the same stands true for the bank, the servicer, the trustee and the Directors of Cairo.
I also feel sorry for everyone that has suffered great losses including myself. However, I do feel this is not over yet!!Hopefully the option will either be cancelled / not exercised, or there is more in the bigger picture about it that we still do not know. Let's see!
What are you thoughts on getting legal counsel to address this? DM me. This is a material misstatement that needs to be taken out of the skin of someone. I imagine there are D&O policies at the company or the auditor to go after.
-Class A Notes: The outstanding principal balance of the Class A Notes plus any accrued but unpaid interest;
-Class B strike price: An amount equal to the sale price of the 20% of the Class B1 in the context of the transaction
completed in June 2020 (grossed-up to reflect the price for 100% of the Class B1 notes), minus any principal
received on the Class B notes prior to the Call Option Date but including all accrued and unpaid interest on the
grossed-up amount; and
-Class C Notes: A fixed amount of €22.040 for Class C1 and €17.960 for Class C2. (page 27 of 2025 annual report)
If I understand the value of the strike price for the option of Cairo 3 as of 1-May-2026 (it seems, that interest have been calculated from June 2020), it is now around 197m (0.64 cent a share) and adding around 30m p.a. (interest on mezzanine). The difficulty I have is to understand why KPMG has valued the Cairo 3 notes as of 31.12.2025 (in my calculation this would be 187.3m – 197 minus 9.66m for the 4 months in 2026) at 145.8m with a 30% probability of exercising the call option.
Additionally KPMG valued the Cairo 3 notes in Cairomezz at the end of 2024 at 240m. That they did not take this call option into account or disclosed it at a much higher value of notes and therefore the option, is difficult to understand.
Thank you. I largely agree with the calculation conceptually and get a similar (slightly higher) number (would expect for interest to accrue from end of 2019 when the notes were issued and see the transacton price closer to 50m.
Also agree that this is not consistent with what KPMG audited last year - a fairly grave mistake in my view.
Curious what your thoughts are on the stock price collapse. Cairo 3 seems still in play although the rate of reduction was less last quarter. Maybe we need a good quarter. The 2024 to 2025 result was good in total. https://www.pdma.gr/en/quarterly-bulletin
Does Deloitte audit their financials? I see KPMG Cyprus having signed the audit reports in each of Cairo's annual financials and the shareholder annual meeting has been voting to approve KPMG as their auditor. Is there some other report Deloitte is auditing?
I see that Deloitte's consulting arm provided a valuation for the spinoff, but that was a long time ago and a third party appraisal process is markedly different than an audit (sometimes more useful, sometimes less, always different.)
2. The sale of ~E5700m claims (with E740m to remain) of Cairo 3 fell apart, apparently because Eurobank did not approve the transaction ( https://nplconfidential.com/why-eurobank-canceled-the-sale-of-alexandria-to-apollo/ ) "because the money paid by Apollo was not enough to repay the reserves provided for by “Hercules” and linked to the financing of the SPV".
The first item should be pretty bad for Cairo 1 and 2, as both are filled with residential mortgages. And those were already a zero to begin with.
And regarding the second item: I struggle to see a lot of value in Cairo 3 if, after selling ~90% of your claims, Eurobank thinks the A tranche is potentially impaired (or at least that is how I am interpreting that statement).
Maybe my interpretation of the second line item is wrong but I struggle to understand why Eurobank would block the loan sale if Apollo paid, for example E300m with E181m in senior debt outstanding. Seems to me the price was going to be disappointing.
Thanks for your thoughts, writser. I have followed and appreciated your work for some time.
On your points:
1) The Katseli ruling in my view is a clear negative which indeed might well lower the recoveries in Cairo 1 and 2 (and other Hercules securitizations). The decision to my knowedge is not finally published. How big is the impact of the fallout? Well, I have seen estimates for the entire Greek NPL securitization market that range from 600m to 1.2b. How much of that is in Cairo 1 and 2? I do not know. The one hope I have is that with more clarity, the speed of collections and amortizations might increase. But yes, agree that the mezz of Cairo No. 1 and 2 appear to be a long shot here, also since we have not seen faster amortizations thus far.
On the other hand, there is the report you are citing. Also, the servicer doValue ran what was supposed to be a competitive auction process and if they contracted with Apollo, there were probably no higher bids around. I also found it confusing that it was first reported what "great" deals were achieved for Giza and Alexandria (https://nplconfidential.com/great-deals-for-dovalue-from-the-giza-and-alexandria-projects/ ). So if anything, I think that all the reporting (positive/negative) should be taken with a grain of salt.
The proof is in the pudding - 2 days ago, we received new data from the PDMA. In Q4, the redemption pace for Cairo3 has slowed down considerably from what was 25m/qtr to more like 5m (table below). Not a good quarter. But we are down to 24% of the original senior tranche notional, the annual redemption is still >100m (after 125m in 2024) and the remaining notional of 181m compares to the 5.7b in claims you cite above. The low redemption rate in Q4/25 may be due to the auction process or technical factors or a worse fundamental development.
Portfolio Cairo 1 Cairo 2 Cairo 3
Total Notional 1837.2 2960.2 2708.9
Org Ntl Sen. 681.0 974.3 754.0
31.12.2023 681.0 905.8 408.5
31.03.2024 679.5 887.3 335.1
30.06.2024 679.5 887.3 335.1
30.09.2024 642.6 842.2 310.2
31.12.2024 639.5 837.8 285.7
31.03.2025 629.7 824.1 241.5
30.06.2025 629.7 823.4 211.6
30.09.2025 629.4 823.3 186.1
31.12.2025 628.4 823.3 181.2
Sorry, if my post is not conclusive - there is a lot of unknows here (to me) and I have question marks myself. Still long Cairo Mezz, will watch all incoming data closely.
"I have followed and appreciated your work for some time." - likewise!
I had a small position in cairomezz and sold it. I have a hard time interpreting the busted sale in a positive way. What also rubs me the wrong way is that no price was disclosed - usually not a good sign.
Perhaps even more important (and probably a reason not to buy in the first place), the whole situation with the Katseli ruling and the busted sale make me doubt whether I have any sort of edge here. I was just tracking the public debt bulletins and making some assumptions to come up with a valuation of the mezz tranche. Might still be a valid approach but with all the politics involved I'm not sure it is enough.
Still think it's a very interesting stock (set of stocks) and I'll keep following them. Will be interesting to see the valuation in the next annual. Keep up the good work!
This was a great read, loved using the Greek Public Debt Management Agency data to get more insight as well as Irish registry filings - really good digging. I'm guessing over time we'll get more data points from them as well. Interesting special sit.
Are you aware that Cairo Mezz was actually presented as an idea at last year's "Weird Shit Investment Conference"? Would be a funny coincidence if this rather unknown and obscure company is selected twice for the purpose haha
Ha, I did no know this. Sorry, my knowledge of the WS Conferences is non-encyclopedic. Hope I could add interesting new aspects anyway.
Came up at the 2026 NYC edition as well.
Ah Cairo Mezz, good old memories 😁. Received the shares via the spin-off. Was a really opaque situation (still is). Have the shares now some liquidity? Sold them during 2020 and it was a real headache because of the abysmaly low liquidity.
Thought doValue would be more interesting because servicing is better than owning assets.
There is decent liquidity in Athens markets (and sometimes in Frankfurt), but I am not sure what size you are looking at. Could build my position relatively quickly.
doValue is interesting and they could earn a windfall from Cairo and other situations aswell. I have not looked through their portfolio. On the other hand, in recent years, their performance has been kind of mediocre and other debt servicers like Intrum have also struggled.
I wonder why did you select Cairo vs the other 3?
Did you examine the portfolio of the others and you felt more comfortable with Cairo?
(disclosure: owner of Galaxy)
I am not an expert on all of them, but I like that Cairo 3 has been the fastest one to pay down so far. Also, the structure of having the mezzanine note interest capitalized is not in place for all the others, e.g. PV pays out mezz interest. I think with capitalized interest, there might be a larger effect if people ever realize that cash actually arrives.
Moreover, I have some comfort in Fairfax being onboard.
Why did the PLC fall by 14% today?
No clue about daily moves, but in general, the Athens market seems to be more liquid and less volatile than Frankfurt.
The Irish filings are super interesting! I wasn’t able to find those in my own quick research after I first read the VIC pitch; the collateralization is decent enough and those mortgages aren’t underwater any longer.
The other angle I need to examine is what repossession or rule of law around repossession looks like in Greece at the moment. How much capacity does DoValue have to actually go after these assets?
Definitely one of my favourite weirdest ideas right now.
Quarterly Debt Bulletin by Greece's PDMA came out yesterday:
https://www.pdma.gr/en/quarterly-bulletin/no118
Cairo 3 redemptions continued and the senior stood at 212m per 30 June. Pretty much no movement for Cairo1 and Cairo2.
What are you thoughts on getting legal counsel to address this material piece of information that was hidden? DM me. This is a material misstatement that needs to be taken out of the skin of someone. I imagine there are D&O policies at the company or the auditor to go after.
Hi there and thank you very much for sharing your thoughts on this!
What is your opinion in the light of Friday's announcement?:
http://www.cairomezz.com.cy/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Announcement_150526.pdf
as an answer to the issue raised by an individual investor within the Greek community of microinvestors..
Opinions are divided here between the following two scenarios that can be drawn based on the wording of the announcement that makes no mention at all about the so far accrued interest on the principal (which is what we all have calculated before buying this stock!):
a) doValue can buy us all out at a fraction of what the above calculations you have discussed indicate i.e. we are screwed!
b) the Strike Price is on top of the accrued interest on the principal starting from 2020 (or 2019 as you say) in order to buy out future revenues (capital + interest), as we (Cairo plc) have established the claim for these influxes from previous years.
Further clarifications on the matter will be asked from the Exchange authorities and thus the company. Also in the General Assembly of the Shareholders that is due next month. However, I would be very much interested to see your thoughts on the matter based on your experience!
Hi Thimios,
thank you for your question. Full Disclosure: I sold out of Cairo Mezz shortly after the annual report was published which contained new information on the call strike price. While the disclosure in the annual financial statements was somewhat ambiguous to me, I would not have invested in Cairo Mezz if that disclosure had been out there before. Consequently, selling appeared appropriate.
As to the Announcement you quote, in my view, a) is the correct interpretation. This is because I do not see any language hinting towards the strike price being on top of the accrued interest. To the contrary, it is clearly stated that the accrued but unpaid interest is included in the strike price. So if doValue had bought the loan portfolio of Cairo 3 by exercising its option on 31 December 2025, Cairo Mezz would have been entitled to receive 65.5m (potentially less costs). There are a few twists and turns and details, such as the strike price increasing over time, costs being higher or lower, the implication for ReoCos, cash on the balance sheet - but that appears to be the rough picture.
What I am honestly struggling with is the role of the independent valuers and auditors. They MUST have known that the option exists and MUST have been able to calculate the current strike price every time they look at this. Yet they did value / audit Cairo 3 B2 for 238m EUR (2024) or 146m EUR (2025). If I own an asset and somebody has the contractual right to buy this asset for 66m EUR, how is it possible to value it at 146m? Implying an §exercise probability" of 30% just means that you think the other party behaves irrationally/stupidly or is restricted from locking in this gains. So in my view, a severe mistake was made in the valuation and audit of the asset. This may be due to gross negligence, lack of professionalism or other reasons but it is clear that these parties did not do their jobs properly and, in consequence, small investors have been suffering and losing money. It should be an "interesting" general meeting and I am not sure how things will develop from here - But I do feel sorry for you and other Greek microinvestors.
Dear Carsten,
thank you for your answer!
Unfortunately I was on travel when the results came on the 30th of April and I did not find the time to review them on time. Had I done that in the correct time I would have probably sold out as well! But only to rebuy at a lower price (lower than the strike price) in my case, as I still believe there is great value in this stock (as well as the rest of the Greek securitisations especially Galaxy Cosmos that is my largest position in this sector).
This whole situation is very frustrating as you can understand! While it is clearly stated in the Admission document (100% clear in the Greek text!) that the buy out option means they will pay the nominal value, they are letting us know now of something very different. Only after the intervention of individual investors to the company and then to the authorities the strike price formula became public knowledge. The role of KPMG is also weird. Gross negligence is the good case scenario for them! As you can understand there is clear scope for legal action in case something like this goes forward.
The coming AGM will be very interesting indeed! It is not official yet, but the community of microinvestors have gathered the 5% that gives us the advanced rights to put pressure to the management to answer our questions and take action against whoever acts against our rightful interests based on the original documentation. We also have the commitment of support by a number of institutional investors that are also surprised by their own admission from this development.
The gun of legal action is obviously on the table, although nooone wishes it will be used. I hope the same stands true for the bank, the servicer, the trustee and the Directors of Cairo.
I also feel sorry for everyone that has suffered great losses including myself. However, I do feel this is not over yet!!Hopefully the option will either be cancelled / not exercised, or there is more in the bigger picture about it that we still do not know. Let's see!
Thanks again for your input!
What are you thoughts on getting legal counsel to address this? DM me. This is a material misstatement that needs to be taken out of the skin of someone. I imagine there are D&O policies at the company or the auditor to go after.
-Class A Notes: The outstanding principal balance of the Class A Notes plus any accrued but unpaid interest;
-Class B strike price: An amount equal to the sale price of the 20% of the Class B1 in the context of the transaction
completed in June 2020 (grossed-up to reflect the price for 100% of the Class B1 notes), minus any principal
received on the Class B notes prior to the Call Option Date but including all accrued and unpaid interest on the
grossed-up amount; and
-Class C Notes: A fixed amount of €22.040 for Class C1 and €17.960 for Class C2. (page 27 of 2025 annual report)
If I understand the value of the strike price for the option of Cairo 3 as of 1-May-2026 (it seems, that interest have been calculated from June 2020), it is now around 197m (0.64 cent a share) and adding around 30m p.a. (interest on mezzanine). The difficulty I have is to understand why KPMG has valued the Cairo 3 notes as of 31.12.2025 (in my calculation this would be 187.3m – 197 minus 9.66m for the 4 months in 2026) at 145.8m with a 30% probability of exercising the call option.
Additionally KPMG valued the Cairo 3 notes in Cairomezz at the end of 2024 at 240m. That they did not take this call option into account or disclosed it at a much higher value of notes and therefore the option, is difficult to understand.
42.95m (https://www.eurobank.gr/-/media/holding/omilos/grafeio-tupou/etairikes-anakoinoseis/2020/etairiki-anakoinosi-07-07-20/translation-valuation-report-eng.pdf)
YEAR average 3-month Euribor margin interest
2026 2.03% 5.00% 7.03% 9.66 4 months in 2026
2025 2.74% 5.00% 7.74% 31.90
2024 3.91% 5.00% 8.91% 36.72
2023 2.16% 5.00% 7.16% 29.54
2022 -0.57% 5.00% 4.43% 18.27
2021 -0.55% 5.00% 4.45% 18.37
2020 -0.38% 5.00% 4.62% 9.53 started June 2020
153.99 without any compound interest
+ 153.99m interest
= € 197m
Thank you. I largely agree with the calculation conceptually and get a similar (slightly higher) number (would expect for interest to accrue from end of 2019 when the notes were issued and see the transacton price closer to 50m.
Also agree that this is not consistent with what KPMG audited last year - a fairly grave mistake in my view.
Curious what your thoughts are on the stock price collapse. Cairo 3 seems still in play although the rate of reduction was less last quarter. Maybe we need a good quarter. The 2024 to 2025 result was good in total. https://www.pdma.gr/en/quarterly-bulletin
Does Deloitte audit their financials? I see KPMG Cyprus having signed the audit reports in each of Cairo's annual financials and the shareholder annual meeting has been voting to approve KPMG as their auditor. Is there some other report Deloitte is auditing?
I see that Deloitte's consulting arm provided a valuation for the spinoff, but that was a long time ago and a third party appraisal process is markedly different than an audit (sometimes more useful, sometimes less, always different.)
Over the past few weeks the following two things happened:
1. The Greek supreme court ruled about Katselia law (see, for example: https://en.protothema.gr/2026/02/09/almost-interest-free-installments-on-an-already-haircut-loan-after-the-supreme-court-decision/ )
2. The sale of ~E5700m claims (with E740m to remain) of Cairo 3 fell apart, apparently because Eurobank did not approve the transaction ( https://nplconfidential.com/why-eurobank-canceled-the-sale-of-alexandria-to-apollo/ ) "because the money paid by Apollo was not enough to repay the reserves provided for by “Hercules” and linked to the financing of the SPV".
The first item should be pretty bad for Cairo 1 and 2, as both are filled with residential mortgages. And those were already a zero to begin with.
And regarding the second item: I struggle to see a lot of value in Cairo 3 if, after selling ~90% of your claims, Eurobank thinks the A tranche is potentially impaired (or at least that is how I am interpreting that statement).
Maybe my interpretation of the second line item is wrong but I struggle to understand why Eurobank would block the loan sale if Apollo paid, for example E300m with E181m in senior debt outstanding. Seems to me the price was going to be disappointing.
What is your take?
Thanks for your thoughts, writser. I have followed and appreciated your work for some time.
On your points:
1) The Katseli ruling in my view is a clear negative which indeed might well lower the recoveries in Cairo 1 and 2 (and other Hercules securitizations). The decision to my knowedge is not finally published. How big is the impact of the fallout? Well, I have seen estimates for the entire Greek NPL securitization market that range from 600m to 1.2b. How much of that is in Cairo 1 and 2? I do not know. The one hope I have is that with more clarity, the speed of collections and amortizations might increase. But yes, agree that the mezz of Cairo No. 1 and 2 appear to be a long shot here, also since we have not seen faster amortizations thus far.
2) As for the cancelled sale, the news I have seen is more mixed. Some thoughts: First of all, Apollo distressed funds are normally not in the business of paying up for assets. They may have estimated cash flows conservatively and put a 20% discount rate on these. So I have heard the view that Cairo would be better off waiting rather selling right now (this case is argued here: https://www.euro2day.gr/news/economy/article/2338326/titlopoihseis-giati-ta-kokkina-daneia-pairnoyn-axi.html or here https://nplconfidential.com/the-improved-valuations-of-the-securitizations-are-delaying-the-sales/). Also, I heard the view that the fast sale was in part politically motivated in that one wanted to show the first full remdemption of a Hercules guarantee.
On the other hand, there is the report you are citing. Also, the servicer doValue ran what was supposed to be a competitive auction process and if they contracted with Apollo, there were probably no higher bids around. I also found it confusing that it was first reported what "great" deals were achieved for Giza and Alexandria (https://nplconfidential.com/great-deals-for-dovalue-from-the-giza-and-alexandria-projects/ ). So if anything, I think that all the reporting (positive/negative) should be taken with a grain of salt.
The proof is in the pudding - 2 days ago, we received new data from the PDMA. In Q4, the redemption pace for Cairo3 has slowed down considerably from what was 25m/qtr to more like 5m (table below). Not a good quarter. But we are down to 24% of the original senior tranche notional, the annual redemption is still >100m (after 125m in 2024) and the remaining notional of 181m compares to the 5.7b in claims you cite above. The low redemption rate in Q4/25 may be due to the auction process or technical factors or a worse fundamental development.
Portfolio Cairo 1 Cairo 2 Cairo 3
Total Notional 1837.2 2960.2 2708.9
Org Ntl Sen. 681.0 974.3 754.0
31.12.2023 681.0 905.8 408.5
31.03.2024 679.5 887.3 335.1
30.06.2024 679.5 887.3 335.1
30.09.2024 642.6 842.2 310.2
31.12.2024 639.5 837.8 285.7
31.03.2025 629.7 824.1 241.5
30.06.2025 629.7 823.4 211.6
30.09.2025 629.4 823.3 186.1
31.12.2025 628.4 823.3 181.2
Sorry, if my post is not conclusive - there is a lot of unknows here (to me) and I have question marks myself. Still long Cairo Mezz, will watch all incoming data closely.
"I have followed and appreciated your work for some time." - likewise!
I had a small position in cairomezz and sold it. I have a hard time interpreting the busted sale in a positive way. What also rubs me the wrong way is that no price was disclosed - usually not a good sign.
Perhaps even more important (and probably a reason not to buy in the first place), the whole situation with the Katseli ruling and the busted sale make me doubt whether I have any sort of edge here. I was just tracking the public debt bulletins and making some assumptions to come up with a valuation of the mezz tranche. Might still be a valid approach but with all the politics involved I'm not sure it is enough.
Still think it's a very interesting stock (set of stocks) and I'll keep following them. Will be interesting to see the valuation in the next annual. Keep up the good work!
This was a great read, loved using the Greek Public Debt Management Agency data to get more insight as well as Irish registry filings - really good digging. I'm guessing over time we'll get more data points from them as well. Interesting special sit.
Very good work, congrats!